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Poland’s autumn election followed the
collapse of the coalition between the
majority Law and Justice Party (PiS) and
the Samoobrona Party and the League of
Polish Families (LPR) two years before the
end of the parliament’s four year term.
The resignation of the government came
in the wake of accusations and counter
accusations between the coalition partners 
of corruption and unconstitutional
behaviour. The short election campaign
saw, in essence, a continuation of little
more than the robust polemics between
PiS and the Civic Platform (PO), the main
opposition party during the government’s 
two years in office. The PiS-led
government’s foreign policy played
a small part in the campaign and what
debate there was between the main
contenders failed to reflect the electorate’s
concerns on Poland’s continued involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as plans to
site a US missile defence base in northern
Poland. The election was fought on the
government’s record in combating corruption
and saw a big mobilisation of voters on
both sides of the political spectrum
around this issue. High economic growth
and declining unemployment during its
entire term helped to buoy PiS’s support
in the election. Ultimately, however, the
contest1 was decided by an unprecedented 
turnout of young people who voted to
reject the government’s traditionalist
domestic policies and inherent suspicion
of the outside world. 
The result of the election saw PO win the
greatest number of seats in the Sejm and
Senate, the two parliamentary chambers.
Subsequently it established a governing
coalition with the Polish People’s Party
(PSL). The government brought in a new
foreign minister, Rados³aw Sikorski, to
replace Anna Fotyga, who is likely to move
to the President’s office. This presages
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1 The parliamentary election was held on 21 October 2007 with an electorate of 30.3 million people and
a turnout of 53.8 per cent. Four parties surmounted the 5 per cent threshold needed to enter parliament. 6.7
million people or 41.5 per cent voted for the pro business Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO)
giving the party 209 seats in the 460 seat Sejm, the lower chamber. The traditionalist Law and Justice Party
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwoœæ – PiS) won 166 seats with 5.2 million voters or a 32.1 per cent share of the ballot. The
Left and the Democrats, an alliance of post communists and the dissident based Demokraci.pl (Lewica
i Demokraci – LiD) came third with 2.1 million voters or a 13.2 per cent share of the turnout gaining 53 seats.
The farm based Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL) came last with 1.4 million votes or
an 8.9 per cent share of the ballot and 31 seats. The populist Samoobrona failed to surmount the 5 per cent
barrier with a 1.5 per cent share of the ballot or 247.3 thousand voters. The right wing, nationalist League of
Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin – LPR), also present, like Samoobrona, in the previous parliament,
failed to get into the Sejm with a 1.3 per cent share of the ballot or 209.1 thousand voters.
PO won the election to the 100-seat Senate winning 60 seats with PiS coming second with 39 seats and the one
remaining seat going to W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former prime minister and foreign minister associated
with the post communist left. Elections to the Sejm are held on a proportional basis under the D’Hondt
system while the Senate is elected on a first past the post system. 
a duality in Polish foreign policy which
will make it difficult for the authorities to
present a coherent face to the outside
world. It will also bring differences on
foreign policy issues into the domestic
political debate, for while PiS lost the
October election, the president, Lech
Kaczynski2, still has three years of his term 
to run. There is every indication that his
approach to PO will be similar to that of
his twin brother Jaros³aw, the head of PiS,
who adopted a combatative stance towards 
the PO in the wake of the election.
The PiS government made a great deal of
the fact that its foreign policy differed
greatly from that of its predecessors in that 
it was more assertive towards the EU as
well as to both Germany and Russia.
However, in some respects there was
a greater measure of continuity with
previous administrations than initially
met the eye. The question facing the
current study is to what extent Poland’s
foreign policy will change with the new
government – in the light of public
attitudes and the election campaign.
The Opinion Polls
Foreign policy, as such, is not the regular
subject of polls in Poland. Individual foreign
policy issues, however, are polled
systematically by CBOS, a publicly funded 
research organisation. These include
popular attitudes to European Union
membership, to the presence of Polish
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the
location of a US missile defence installation
in northern Poland and to attitudes to
Poland’s largest neighbours, Germany
and Russia. All of these were the subject of 
polls in the months before the October
election, as was a general study of the
government’s record3, which included
a specific question on foreign policy. This
showed a measure of unease about the
government’s record in this field. Thus
Jerzy Buzek, a right of centre premier, saw
68 per cent giving him a good or adequate
mark in this field in 2001; Marek Belka, the 
centre left prime minister, saw 61 per cent
backing him in these categories while
Jaros³aw Kaczyñski finished at a lower
50 per cent. Respectively, the three leaders
saw 17 per cent, 15 per cent and 38 per cent 
saying that their foreign policy had been
‘inadequate’. While this result showed
that public opinion as a whole was
concerned at PiS’s performance in foreign
policy, the foreign policy elites4 were still
more so, finding little to praise in the
policies followed by Anna Fotyga after she 
became foreign minister in May 2006.
The pre election studies showed public
opinion deeply at variance with PiS
government policy on both the European
Union and participation in military
expeditions abroad as well as the United
States’ missile defence plans. A survey
conducted in May 20075 on attitudes to the 
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2 Poland’s 1997 constitution says that the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces and acts 
as the representative of the state in foreign policy with responsibility for ratifying international treaties,
appointing Polish ambassadors and accrediting foreign ambassadors in Poland. However, it is the
government that conducts foreign policy. In 2005-2007, under the PiS government, Jaros³aw Kaczynski, the
President’s twin brother, left responsibility for foreign policy, to a great extent, to the president. It was he who 
generally travelled to EU summits, for example. 
3 CBOS, ”Szczegó³owe oceny dzia³alnoœci rz¹du”, September 2007, BS/145/2007.
4 See ”G³ówne Wyzwania Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej, Doœwiadczenie i Przysz³oœæ” working paper,
Warsaw autumn 2007. 
5 CBOS, ”O modelu integracji europejskiej i eurokonstytucji”, June 2007, BS/99/2007.
European Union showed 89 per cent of
Poles supporting Polish membership of
the EU and a mere 5 per cent against. This
compares to 70 per cent for EU membership
in August 2004 (21 per cent against), just
after Polish accession, and 73 per cent in
favour (16 per cent against) in September
2005 when PiS won the parliamentary
election. This means that support for the
EU actually grew in Poland despite the
country being governed by the most
eurosceptic administration since 1989.
This included the nationalist League of
Polish Families (LPR), which was openly
hostile to the EU and Samoobrona, which
demonstrated its diffidence about European
integration during successive election
campaigns. The growth in support is
mainly to be explained by a change in
stance by Poland’s farmers after they
began to receive subsidies under the
Common Agricultural Policy.
It is also true that even though PiS
demonstrated its unhappiness about
the EU and engaged in successive
confrontations with Brussels – support in
the towns for the EU remained extremely
strong. At the same time a mere 21 per
cent of Poles thought that the PiS
government’s policies towards the EU
actually strengthened their country’s
position6 in the Union. One third thought
the opposite while 30 per cent thought that 
PiS government policy made no difference.
The other mismatch between the opinion
polls and actual policy conducted by the
PiS government as well as its predecessor, 
the post-communist Left Democratic
Alliance (SLD), was over military
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Poland currently has detachments of
around 1,000 troops to both countries
fighting the war against terrorism.
Popular support for the deployment in
Iraq7  reached 36 per cent in July 2003 and
peaked at 42 per cent in January 2004
falling to 16 per cent in October 2007.
A similar pattern emerges on Afghanistan, 
a NATO rather than US-led operation,
with support peaking at 57 per cent in
April of 2002 (when the Polish contingent
was planned at a mere 300 personnel) and
falling to 19 per cent in October 2007
(opposition reached 77 per cent in this
poll). All this time government policy
failed to change and neither did criticism
of the war by both the LPR and
Samoobrona (muted when both were in
the government coalition with PiS) make
any impact on the government stance.
In a similar vein, public support for the
planned US missile defence installation in
northern Poland fell as debate on the issue
mounted. In December 2005, half of the
population supported the plans, but that
figure fell to 28 per cent by July 2007, with
opposition reaching 56 per cent in the
same month8. Here, too, opposition to the
project from the LPR and Samoobrona
failed to affect the government, which
continued to speak out in favour of having 
the installation located in Poland.
The surveys conducted in the months
preceding the election showed that Poles
feel secure about in their post-1989 status
as a sovereign nation. Whilst as many as
44 per cent thought in February 1991 that
Poland’s independence was threatened,
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6 CBOS, ”Opinie o sytuacji Polski na arenie miêdzynarodowej i stosunkach z Niemcami”, July 2007,
BS/117/2007.
7 CBOS, ”Stosunek do obecnoœci ¿o³nierzy Polskich w Iraku i Afganistanie”, October 2007, BS/162/2007.
8 CBOS, ”Opinie o instalacji tarczy antyrakietowej w Polsce”, August 2007, BS/133/2007.
that figure had fallen to a mere 13 per cent
in June 20079. In June 2007, as many as 73
per cent thought there was no threat to
their country’s independence. Since 1989,
Poles have also become increasingly relaxed
about their long term relations with
Germany. In February 1991, half thought
that post-war reconciliation with Germany
was impossible, to the 44 per cent who
believed the opposite. By June 2007,
though, reconciliation was thought
possible by as many as 80 per cent, while a
mere 14 per cent remained unconvinced.
Nevertheless, the two years of PiS rule,
which saw an almost constant tussle with
Germany over responsibility for the
wartime past and its aftermath, resulted
in a major drop in the number of Poles
thinking that bilateral relations were
positive, with a majority blaming the
Germans for this deterioration. Ominously
for the prospects for an improvement
in relations between Warsaw and Berlin
within the framework of the EU, as many
as 51 per cent of Poles said they were
concerned about Germany strengthening
its position in the EU.
Ahead of the election, as many as 54 per
cent of Poles considered relations with
Russia10 to be bad, reflecting a dispute
over a gas pipeline planned under the
Baltic in cooperation with German energy
companies by Gazprom, the Russian gas
producer and an ongoing conflict over
Moscow’s ban of Polish meat imports. The 
PiS government enjoyed the support of
a majority in its tough stance on the import
embargo, as well as Warsaw’s consequent
veto on the preparation of an EU
negotiating mandate for a new Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between
the EU and Russia to replace the current
one, which expires at the end of this
month. Around one third of Poles think
that Russia’s stance on bilateral relations is 
dictated by a failure to treat Poland as
an equal partner, while another third
fears that Russia is unable to come to
terms with the loss of its influence over
Poland.
The Political Platforms
11
  
Election programmes belong to a grey
area in Polish politics. Their contents are
rarely, if ever, reported in the media. They
are almost never discussed by a political
party’s rank and file, nor do party political 
activists contribute to their contents. They
are also largely ignored by the party’s
opponents, for that matter. However, the
absence of these documents would
immediately be picked up as proof that
a given party has no ideas. So they are
authored and published before every
election campaign. They are useful,
though, insofar as they provide a snapshot 
of the state of mind of a party’s political
leadership as it faces the voters. The
foreign affairs chapter is usually to be
found towards the end of the programme,
thus reflecting the prominence that
politicians are willing to accord this area.
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9 CBOS, BS/117/2007 op. cit.
10 CBOS, ”Polska-Rosja. Bezpieczeñstwo energetyczne i opinie o wzajemnych stosunkach”, June 2007,
BS/105/2007.
11 This chapter will examine the programmes of the four parties which were elected to parliament. The
League of Polish Families (LPR) , a radical, anti European group and the populist Samoobrona gained a mere
1.5 per cent of the poll each and thus have disappeared from the political arena. During the election campaign 
LPR demanded, for example, that the EU reform treaty be put a referendum. The call, like many other LPR
initiatives was not taken up by the other parties and the group’s ideas have been marginalised. 
For the PO, foreign policy came on page 74 
of an 84 page document12. 
Pride of place in the PO programme is
given to the question of ‘how, thanks to
EU membership, Poland can catch up with 
the old EU members’ and ‘not permit itself 
to be outpaced by the other new member
states’. The vague answer to this question
is that economic reforms must continued
and the implementation of EU development
funds maximised. At the same time,
the programme hints that the EU budget
should be expanded and pledges that the
PO will strive to ‘maintain and develop
the support mechanisms for poorer
regions and member states’. The PO also
promises to be active in creating a common
EU energy policy ‘that will guarantee
Polish interests’. The PO pledges to
‘deepen integration in the area of common 
foreign and security policy’ and to see
a ‘strong EU remaining in strategic relations
in partnership with the United States’. The 
programme adds that it is Poland’s
interest that the Lisbon strategy should be
realised and declares that Poles should
have access to all labour markets in the
EU. The PO promises to play an ‘active’
role in the forthcoming EU budget review, 
as well to consult the public over the date
of euro-adoption. The future of the
Common Agricultural Policy will, according
to the PO, be the subject of ‘active and
effective lobbying’ that will aim to
modernise the sector. No further details
are offered.
The PO goes on to hint that it will adopt
a more robust approach to the United
States, while remaining its ‘close ally’. PO
also wants a ‘US presence in Europe as
well as a Polish-American strategic
partnership. But this will involve a ‘sober
approach and attention to an assessment
of the real benefits’ for Poland. The
programme places great stress on NATO
as the ‘main guarantor of Poland’s
security’ and sees NATO as ‘a platform of
the unity of the West’. The programme
does not devote any specific attention to
the issue of the US missile defence system,
merely remarking that the system should
be in accord with ‘NATO theories of an
allied defence against short and medium
range’ missiles. Nonetheless, the EU’s
Security and Defence Policy should be
‘deepened and strengthened’, becoming,
in time, a ‘second pillar of Poland’s
defences, equal to NATO’. The PO
programme sees NATO in both a defensive
role and as an active participant in ‘peace
operations and the fight against terrorist
threats’. At the same time the PO sounds
a note of caution on military operations
abroad, and suggests that the Polish
presence in Iraq should not be ‘extended
for another year’. Regarding Afghanistan,
PO wants to see the Polish involvement in
the NATO operation to evolve towards
a civilian, nation-building operation. The
party also pledges greater parliamentary
control over budgets for military
operations abroad and thus greater
parliamentary control over military
operations abroad present and future.
In its policy towards Poland’s neighbours,
the PO promises a return to an active role
in the Weimar Triangle in which Polish,
French and German leaders meet to
exchange views on policy. The party also
says it will aim to improve bilateral
relations with Germany, the Czechs, the
Slovaks and Lithuania. The PO will strive
to conclude the disputes in Poland’s
relations with Germany that derive from
the ‘tragic past’. The PO foresees a ‘long
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12 Program PO, ”Polska zas³uguje na cud gospodarczy”, Warsaw 2007.
march’ and ‘a patient dialogue’ in
relations with Russia, declaring that ‘good
neighbourly relations’ can be re-established.
Ukraine is described as a ‘great and
important’ partner of Poland’s. The PO
said it would remain committed to
supporting democratic changes in the
country and an ‘ally in Ukraine’s drive to
come closer to NATO and the EU’. The PO
cautions, however, that this process ‘will
take longer than initially thought’. Belarus 
is not mentioned. 
The PO programme is, predictably, critical 
of PiS’ record in foreign policy. Equally
predictably, the PiS programme13 praises
its own foreign policy record. The
programme declares that ‘Poland’s position
in the EU has unquestionably been
strengthened; we are an increasingly
important partner in the EU’. It also claims 
that ‘we have initiated de-communisation, 
the professionalization and a generational
change in the Polish diplomatic service’.
The PiS policy pledges carry no more than
academic value in that the party lost the
election and thus the power to implement
policy. But the fact that the PiS leader’s
twin brother has another three years of his
presidential term to run means that the
election promises are worth noting, as the
party’s philosophy is likely to underlie the
foreign policy promoted by the presidential
palace. 
Like PO, the PiS programme sees NATO
as an important element of Poland’s
security. PiS, though, leaves no doubt that
military operations abroad are a key
foreign policy element that help to bolster
Poland’s ‘international status and security’.
The programme declares that Poland
should work to ‘strengthen NATO as well
as build a common European defence
policy’. PiS pays more attention than PO
to the missile defence programme, which
it sees as an ‘element of Poland’s security
and strategic partnership with the US’.
Nevertheless, PiS promises ‘hard
negotiations’ with the US over the
installation of a missile defence base in the
country, echoing the PO pledge that
it ‘will adopt a sober approach and
assessment of the real benefits’ of relations 
with the US. PiS declares that it will
undertake efforts to ensure the country’s
energy security within the NATO
framework and, more enigmatically,
through the EU’s treaty process. The other
threat to Poland’s security remains
unnamed in the programme but can be
identified by the careful reader as
Germany. On this point, the programme
says that ‘attempts are being made to
falsify the truth and moral responsibility
for the tragic consequences of the Second
World War’. PiS declares that the ‘the scale 
of the revisionist threat means that we
should reconsider the sense of conducting
policies of reconciliation’. It also touches
on attempts by some former inhabitants of 
German territories located in present-day
Poland to obtain compensation for their
loss of property. ‘We are taking steps to
ensure that citizens who are threatened by
this will be legally protected’. While
Germany is not discussed by name in the
programme, Russia is mentioned in
passing, when PiS says that ‘the EU finally
declared its solidarity with Poland in the
dispute with Russia over its baseless and
politically motivated trade embargo’. 
Germany is again not mentioned by name
but does appear in the paragraphs dealing
with the EU, which declare that ‘we are
afraid that the Union will be dominated by 
the strongest, most highly populated and
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economically powerful countries’. PiS
promises to fight this dominance inside
the EU. The programme pledges to ensure
that the new Common Agricultural Policy
will strengthen Polish farming; the
forthcoming EU budget review fails to
even merit a mention. Neighbourhood
policy does, however, appear. PiS declares 
that the EU’s neighbourhood policy
should be more involved in eastern
Europe and the countries of the Caucasus.
The programme says that ‘we are in favour 
of ensuring speedy and sure perspectives of
membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures,
particularly for Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia as well as for other partners in the
region, such as Azerbaidjan, Armenia and
Belarus in the future’. Interestingly,
neither the PO nor PiS programmes make
any mention of policy towards Turkish
accession or that of the Balkan countries.
If there are gaps in the PiS programme,
then the PSL election manifesto14 is
positively laconic, being composed entirely 
of bullet points. This is a pity, because PSL
is set to become the junior partner in the
new governing coalition, and its
programme gives little indication of the
party’s views on foreign policy. The
manifesto does, however, declare that the
PSL favours the withdrawal of Polish
military units from both Iraq and
Afghanistan ‘without delay’ as their actions
‘do not strengthen Poland’s security’. On
EU issues, the PSL, which is in the
European People’s Party (EPP) in the
European Parliament, declares that it will
‘support the construction of a Europe of
nations to protect the sovereignty and the
identity of the nations and states of
Europe’. The PSL goes no further on its
policy towards Russia and Germany than
to say ‘we will repair good relations with
Poland’s closest neighbours’. The PSL also 
states that Poland’s ‘strong position’ in the 
EU will strengthen the country’s role in
relations with the United States. Poland’s
security will be ensured by having the
country ‘play a role in NATO, in the UN,
EU, OSCE and through policies which aim 
at strengthening peace in the world and
solidarity in the development of all
countries and nations’.
The staggering banality of the PSL’s
election programme contrasts with the
maturity of the Lewica i Demokraci (LiD)
manifesto15. However, LiD, which brings
together the Democratic Left Alliance
(SLD) (the post communists), the Social
Democrats (an SLD breakaway group),
and the Democrats.pl (a party with its
roots in the dissident movement of the
1970’s16), won third place in the election
and looks likely to be isolated in the
current parliament. The PO is unlikely to
reach out for its support because of the
latter’s communist roots, and for this
reason PiS is even less likely to make
common cause with LiD in opposition.
The LiD programme shows, though, that it 
is the most unreservedly pro-western
grouping in the new parliament. It openly
describes itself as a ‘pro-European political
force’ and argues that Polish foreign
policy should concentrate on reversing the 
damage wrought by the outgoing PiS-led
administration with its European policy.
LiD promises to place Poland at ‘the centre 
of gravity of the European political
project’. LiD favours rapid euro-adoption
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15 ”Nowa Polityka, Nowa Nadzieja”, Warsaw 2007.
16 The SLD and the Social Democrats are in the Socialist group In the European Parliament while the
Democrats belong to the liberal (ALDE) group. 
and the completion of the single market
regarding the flow of services, people,
goods and capital. While market
mechanisms should be introduced into
future Common Agricultural Policy,
LiD comes out strongly against any
renationalisation of the CAP. It also argues 
for a continuation of cohesion policies that
would favour developing member states.
LiD declares that it will work for an
improvement in Poland’s relations with
Germany. But it warns that this could
become more difficult if the structures
of the EU and NATO were to be eroded.
LiD supports the ‘perspective of EU and
NATO membership for some states in the
east’. However, the programme, in contrast
to the PiS document, fails to say which
states these would be. As far as Russia is
concerned, LiD proposes ‘a model of
relations which is based on promoting
democracy and human rights’ and a return
to a strategic dialogue with Russia.
Relations with the United States remain
a ‘traditional priority’, but this has to be
bolstered by the EU’s Defence and
Security policy as well as the Common
Foreign and Security policy. LiD calls for
the opening of talks with ‘our allies’ on
a withdrawal of ‘Polish troops from Iraq
by the end of 2007’. There is no mention of
Afghanistan. On energy security policy,
LiD argues for more emphasis on energy
saving measures. “It would be erroneous
to concentrate exclusively on security
of supply’, the programme says.
The Campaign 
Foreign policy did not play a key role in
the election campaign itself. PO launched
its billboard campaign with posters
suggesting that Poles were ‘ashamed’
of their country’s image abroad as a result
of their opponents’ policies. However,
the party then shifted its focus to the Poles
living abroad who, it suggested, had
emigrated because of the PiS-led
government’s policies. Indeed, PO
television spots predicted that Poles
would start coming home if the party were 
to form the next government. 
The three hour-long television debates17
that punctuated the short campaign did,
however, give some exposure to foreign
policy issues as they were a mandatory
section in the discussions. The main
debate was between the front runners,
Jaros³aw Kaczynski (PiS) and Donald
Tusk (PO). This saw the two party leaders
clash on the issue of Polish-German
relations as well as on a withdrawal
timetable for the Polish troops in Iraq,
energy security policy, and the rejection
by Poland of the EU’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Kaczynski accused
Tusk of being too ‘soft’ over disputes
concerning the property rights of Germans
who had been residents of territories
which now belong to Poland. Tusk dodged
the issue of how he would seek to improve 
relations with Germany and Russia, which 
he claimed had deteriorated under PiS.
The PiS leader was keen to move swiftly
onto the issue of the EU’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which his government
said could lead to a legalisation of
homosexual marriages in Poland. Tusk
chose to fight on the issue of Iraq, charging 
Kaczynski with a lack of coherent policy
and was keeping Polish troops there
unnecessarily long. Kaczynski argued that
the presence of the troops means that
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17 Jaros³aw Kaczyñski (PiS) debated with Aleksander Kwaœniewski (LiD) on October 2, and with Donald
Tusk (PO) on October 12 while Aleksander Kwaœniewski finished up the series with Donald Tusk (PO) on
October 16, five days before the election on October 21.
Poland was now ‘noticed’ in the world,
while Tusk said that Poland had gained
little in terms of material advantage in
return for its efforts in Iraq. 
Earlier, Kaczynski had debated with
Aleksander Kwasniewski, president in
1995-2005, who was not running for office
but fronted the LiD campaign. In their
discussion of foreign affairs, the two men
concentrated mostly on the past. The PiS
leader charged that Poland’s foreign
policy had been too conciliatory to the
country’s partners abroad. This is the
famed ‘Poland had been negotiating on its
knees’ argument that PiS had often used
when in office to criticise its predecessors
and justify purges in the foreign ministry.
Kwasniewski, predictably, denied the
charge, arguing that the country had
joined key western institutions, such as
the EU and NATO, during this period. The 
debate failed to touch on the issue of Iraq
or indeed any concrete matters relating to
future policy in the EU. Indeed, the future
remained largely absent from the
exchange.
The last debate between Aleksander
Kwasniewski and Donald Tusk lacked the
dramatic tension of the exchange between
Kaczynski and Tusk, as polling figures
showed that LiD had little chance of
winning a large enough share of the ballot
to have any influence on future policy. The 
exchange did, however, reflect popular
concerns in the foreign policy field such as
Iraq and the continued presence of Polish
troops there, with both protagonists
suggesting that Polish involvement there
should end.
While the debates touched on the issue of
Iraq, the question of withdrawal never
became a key topic in the campaign. This
was despite the fact that the Polish
ambassador in Bagdad, General Edward
Pietrzyk, had survived a serious bomb
attack at the hands of Iraqi terrorists
during the campaign, and that attacks on
Polish military personnel were stepped up 
in an attempt to get the issue of troop
recall onto the political agenda in Poland.
This strategy failed, underscoring once
more the mismatch between popular
opposition to Poland’s military involvement 
abroad and an inability to have these
attitudes translated into concrete political
action at home.
The other issue which could have but
didn’t emerge as a major debating point in 
the campaign was the EU’s Reform Treaty, 
which President Lech Kaczynski was due
to accept in Lisbon at a summit two days
before the election. Right up till the last
minute, there were fears in the other
member states that PiS would demand
extra concessions from their partners
in the EU and refuse to accept the draft
version agreed in Brussels in the summer.
This would have been a good opportunity
for PiS to demonstrate a ‘hard’ stance on
the EU to their own voters and maybe
mobilise waverers from other camps.
However, Poland confirmed its support
for the draft in Lisbon, which PiS had
celebrated as a success of its own EU
policy. Indeed, PiS largely kept its
euro-sceptic stance off the menu of
election issues. EU policy was a subject of
dispute between the parties during the
campaign only on the issue of to how to
best handle negotiations within the EU
itself, but EU membership was not
questioned by the main contenders. Also
absent was any discussion on the positions 
Poland will take in the looming debate
inside the EU in the nearest future – on the
budget, the common agricultural policy
and future cohesion policy.
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The aftermath
Poland’s new government was sworn on
16 November 2007, almost a month after
the election. PO leader Tusk became prime 
minister of a coalition between PO and the 
PSL, headed by Waldemar Pawlak, as
junior partner. Tusk invited Rados³aw
Sikorski, who resigned earlier this year as
defence minister in the PiS government, to 
become foreign minister. Sikorski joined
the ranks of the PO shortly before the
election campaign, a move that the PiS
leadership found difficult to forgive. Even
as the new administration was being
mooted, the president signalled18 that
he was totally opposed to Sikorski’s
appointment to the foreign ministry
(MFA). As a result, there will be an
additional tension between the PO-led
government and the president’s office
right from the start. Relations between the
two institutions would have been difficult
in any case given the differences which
divide the two parties in their vision of
Poland’s foreign policy. However, the
additional conflict over Sikorski will only
exacerbate those differences.
The result of the Polish election was
greeted with relief in many EU capitals –
including Berlin – all of which look
forward to more positive bilateral and EU
policies emanating from Warsaw. Senior
foreign policy officials in Kiev also hailed
the PO victory warmly, as they had been
concerned that the Polish government’s
euro-sceptic stance had largely cancelled
out the effect of the support that Poland
had given to their drive for closer relations 
with the EU. Even Moscow seemed
prepared for a fresh start in its relations
with Poland, signalling that the Russian
ban on Polish meat imports would be
reconsidered now that a new administration
was due to take power in Warsaw. Such
optimism was sometimes tempered in
eastern Europe by concerns that Poland
would drop its tough stance towards
Moscow. This had been admired by those
who fear renewed Russian assertiveness.
The PiS government’s defiant attitude
towards Brussels had also won plaudits in
eastern Europe, where some saw it as
a sign that the new member states did not
necessarily have to agree with each and
every decision which came from the EU or
the older members. ‘Now Poland will
become like all the other consensual EU
member states and the EU will lose that
defiant tone which might reinvigorate it’,
noted a Ukrainian businessman who has
worked in Brussels.
It does seem likely that Polish policy in the 
EU will now become less confrontational.
But it has to be remembered that, in the
past, PO had supported the independent
tone which Poland adopted both in the
negotiations on the draft Constitutional
Treaty as well as in the most recent round
on the Reform Treaty. Both Lech Kaczynski,
the president, and Donald Tusk, the prime
minister, will travel together to Lisbon to
the signing of the Reform Treaty which
Kaczynski negotiated on Poland’s behalf.
The present administration does not have
the two thirds majority in parliament
(even with the support of LiD) needed to
ratify the treaty and presidential officials
have said that PiS would oppose
ratification if the terms of the agreement
which Lech Kaczynski approved were to
be changed by PO. This would cover the
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18 PiS conducted a sustained and public campaign against Sikorski’s candidature implying that there
were security reasons for him not to be trusted with high rank in the government. However the president had
no choice but to approve the nomination once Donald Tusk had made it clear that he would not abandon
Sikorski. 
Polish opt outs from the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights which PiS maintains
could open the door to German
restitutional claims on Polish property
and changes in Poland’s abortion and
marriage laws.
Poland will adopt a less strident tone
in policy towards Germany although the
issue of the German-Russian gas pipeline
under the Baltic to which Warsaw is
opposed will continue to bedevil relations
with Berlin. The fate of policy towards
Russia remains to an extent in Moscow’s
hands. The simplest way to achieve an
improvement would be for Russia to lift
its ban on Polish meat imports. If this does
not happen then any attempt to warm
relations could see harsh criticism from
PiS and the president. Both these issues –
the gas pipeline and relations with Russia – 
are connected, and the new government
will seek to resolve them within the
framework of the EU and not outside it, as
PiS initially tried to do.
European neighbourhood policy and EU
enlargement will be another topic where
Poland will continue to make its views felt
in the EU. A European perspective for
Ukraine will remain a priority for Poland
and Warsaw will continue to speak for an
active EU policy in eastern Europe.
It remains to be seen how the new
government will seek to press its case in
the light of widespread ‘enlargement
fatigue’ in the old member states. Poland’s 
style will probably change but the level of
commitment will not. It is more than likely 
that Warsaw will seek to harness the
Weimar mechanism as well as the
Visegrad forum (periodic meetings
between leaders of the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) to
promote its view of eastern policy inside
the EU.
At the same time these concerns will be
overshadowed by the debate inside the
EU on its future budget, cohesion and
agricultural policy. Here Poland has well
defined interests to defend, namely the
maintenance of a common and not national
EU farm support policy and continuing
EU aid for developing regions. The official 
Polish stance is as yet in an embrionic
stage, and there is still room for the
construction of a position which could
seek to address the concerns of both the
member states which want to keep the
budget down and those that want to see
a continuation of traditional, re-distributional
policies. However, domestic political
considerations and a simple lack of
imagination may push the PO and its PSL
coalition partner, into a confrontational
stance on budget issues that would
overshadow anything seen under the
outgoing PiS administration. Especially as
PiS, in opposition, will be relentless in
criticising anything it sees as a failure to
defend Polish interests.
Relations with the United States might
also see a greater measure of continuity
than expected. Pre-election opinion polls
and statements by PO during the
campaign clearly point to the need for an
exit from Iraq. However the question
remains as to how and when this is to be
done. There is also the vexed issue of the
installation of US missile defence facilities
in northern Poland, where popular
opposition and a cross party consensus in
support of the plans remains in place. To
judge by statements durning the election
campaign and their party manifestos,
politicians of all parties consider that the
US should be persuaded to pay a price for
the right to install its equipment on Polish
territory. The position of Rados³aw
Sikorski, the new foreign minister, will be
crucial in this respect. In the past, Sikorski
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acquired the reputation of being pro
American. During his term as defence
minister, he argued  increasingly for
a greater involvement – be it financial or in 
terms of equipment – by the US in
Poland’s defence capability, in return for
Poland’s military presence in Iraq and
support for the missile defence system. In
this he failed to see eye to eye with key
decision makers in the Bush administration.
Ironically PiS, which has made assertiveness
in foreign policy a hall mark of its term in
office, has criticised Sikorski for being too
assertive in relations with the US. It seems
unlikely that much will change in
Sikorski’s attitude towards the US as
foreign minister. 
Poland’s outgoing government made
much of the fact that its foreign policy
marked a clean break with that of its
predecessors, whom it accused of failing
to defend Polish national interests.
However the SLD government which
ruled Poland till 2005 stood up to the other 
EU member states in its stance on the
Constitutional Treaty as much as did PiS
in its position on the EU’s Reform Treaty.
Moreover the SLD took Poland into Iraq
and raised no public objections to the US
missile defence installation plans.These
policies were continued by PiS. The SLD
also saw a big deterioration in relations
with France and Germany over its positive 
policies towards Washington, while PiS’s
relations with Germany were notoriously
bad. There was little difference between
the two governments in neighbourhood
policy and support for a democratic and
independent Ukraine. Nor were relations
with Russia markedly better during the
SLD’s term in office. 
Poland’s new PO-PSL government has the 
opportunity to ditch its predecessor’s
policies and has underlined that it will
seek to repair relations with the EU, as
well as with Russia and Germany. In
contrast to PiS and SLD, the PO has hinted
that it will put the Polish relationship with
the US on more of an equal footing.
However the main foreign policy
challenges facing Poland remain the same
and the new administration may well find
itself adopting assertive positions in many 
of these areas. This will provide a greater
measure of continuity in foreign policy,
in both content and style, than first meets
the eye. 
The author is the head of Unia & Polska, a pro
European NGO based in Warsaw. He was for
many years the Warsaw Correspondent for
the Financial Times of London.
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